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

Capacity Analysis for Evacuation of Indian Diaspora

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since 1991, India has been involved in six major evacuations from West Asia alone. Mass evacuations have become a recurrent feature and it is very likely that the Indian government will be called upon for similar missions in future.

On the other hand, the current Indian government has opted for a proactive outreach towards the diaspora. For instance, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the merger of the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) cards to a packed crowd of about 18000 Indians at Madison Square Garden, New York.[1] The strong outreach continued with NRIs in West Asia when the PM told an Indian audience in Dubai in August 2015, "Wherever my Indians are, we never see the colour of the passport, their link with the motherland is enough."[2]

The proactive outreach combined with the likelihood that the diaspora might be exposed to multifarious risks in their host countries, implies that the greatest concern for the Indian government will be to achieve a quick and safe evacuation of Indians.

This policy brief does a capacity analysis of civilian and military assets that are required for a successful evacuation. The brief concludes that if needed, India would be able to achieve successful evacuation of about 3 million Indians from Qatar between **13 to 42,** and from Saudi Arabia between **15 to 50** days under certain circumstances/constraints. Similarly, evacuation from Fiji to India can be done between **7 to 23** days.[3]

The policy brief recommends that to enhance the capacity of evacuation in times of stress:

First, *the government should include an evacuation clause in the licensing of commercial airlines, which can be invoked for bolstering the existing capacity during any crisis.*[4] *This would mandate provision of aircraft and crew of the commercial airlines as required by the government in any part of the world for evacuation operations in the quickest possible time.*

Second, *the Indian missions abroad must have standing agreements with logistics companies that will ensure immediate availability of the latter's assets such as trucks and buses for road transportation whenever a crisis erupts.*

Third, *the government must have access to operational sea and air bases for uninterrupted operations in neutral countries wherever there is a major concentration of the Indian diaspora.*

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[1] Archis Mohan,"PM repackages UPA proposal of merging PIO-OCI cards" *Business Standard,* September 30, 2014. goo.gl/VWWE59

[2] Press Trust of India,"UAE Visit: Nine major things PM Modi said to Indian Diaspora" August 18, 2015. goo.gl/puwTxW

[3] Qatar has been chosen for study because the maximum number of mass evacuations till date have taken place from West Asia. Fiji has been chosen because of its considerable distance (12260 Km from India) and sizeable diaspora.

[4] Nitin Pai, "Defending the Diaspora" *The Hindu*, February 4, 2016. goo.gl/HVVOS0

1. INTRODUCTION

Evacuating Indians throughout the world during times of crises has been carried out time and again by the Indian government. The proactive outreach towards the diaspora of the current government has only meant that the government has taken on additional responsibility onto itself of helping them out in times of crises.

However, there has been no systematic assessment of the capacity requirements should a need for large scale evacuation arise. For example, the Indian diaspora population in West Asia stands at 7.3 million[5]. The largest evacuation done by India till date was before the Gulf War in 1991, when more than 0.17 million people were evacuated by Air India in 67 days.[6] Even if India has to evacuate only 10 per cent of 7.3 million of the Indian diaspora from the troubled spots of West Asia, it would amount to a staggering figure of more than 0.7 million, i.e. more than four times the number evacuated in 1991. Thus, should the need arise for large scale evacuation, the current lift capacity is woefully inadequate.

This policy brief analyses the capacity assessment needed for evacuation of Indians. It is not the stated aim of the brief to make a value judgment on whether the Indian state owes a responsibility all people of Indian origin abroad.

Mass evacuations from foreign soil present several challenges and risks to the government. These challenges range from political, diplomatic, military to media and perception management. Politically, both domestic and international community will need to be managed successfully. Intense diplomatic manoeuvres and negotiations at the political level with host countries will distinguish a successful operation from an aborted one.

This policy brief is divided into four sections. *Section 2* will outline the framework for strategic policy options to evacuate Indians. *Section 3* has two probable scenarios for evacuation—West Asia and Fiji. *Section 4* will conclude with policy recommendations.

2. FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

2.1 Evacuation in times of military conflict or otherwise

Evacuation can be better planned if more reaction time is available, for example, during times of exploitation of expatriate Indian workers by their host country employers, which affords reaction time for diplomacy. In times of a crisis like an armed conflict which can escalate suddenly, the reaction time available with the Ministry of External Affairs, Indian embassies and missions abroad, and the people to be evacuated will be extremely short.

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[5] Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India accessed on March 23, 2016. The site has been closed down after the MOIA merged with the MEA in February 2016.
[6] Note 2 Ibid.

Quick and correct decision making requiring the availability of a sufficient number of operational assets for evacuation will play a key role in such a scenario.

2.2 Large Diaspora Population

The operation is compounded by the large diaspora population. According to the United Nations, India has the largest diaspora population in the world.[7] As per the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, the total Indian population around the world is about 29 million. *Figure 1* summarises the variations within the Indian diaspora umbrella.[8] An even detailed classification of the Indian diaspora is given in *Appendix 1*.



Figure 1: The Indian Diaspora

[7] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Population Division,"International Migration Report 2015."goo.gl/f82Sf4

[8] Detailed diagram in appendix 1

2.3 Risks to Diaspora

Members of the diaspora expect that India will stand by them in the hour of their need. C.Raja Mohan and Rishika Chauhan argue that the diaspora might face several risks in their host country which will need a response by the government.[9] This could range from benign diplomatic response to strong condemnation at international fora. In extreme cases, the government might have to evacuate its citizens with the use of armed forces and commercial means which might cost hundreds or even thousands crores of rupees. The Indian government should have a risk matrix mapped for each of the major areas of the world where Indian diaspora reside. The map below shows the numerical concentration of Indian diaspora across the world. It can be seen that the highest concentration is in West Asia followed by North America. The evacuation plans must cater for contingency in every geographic area.



Region	NRIs	PIOs
West Asia	7.26 Mn	17,000
North America	1.45 Mn	4.01 Mn
South-East/ East Asia	0.73 Mn	4.62 Mn
Europe & Russia	0.72 Mn	2.08 Mn
Australia & New Zealand	0.29 Mn	0.34 Mn

Region	NRIs	PIOs
North-East/ East/ South Africa	82,000	1.59 Mn
North/ West/ Central Africa	61,000	700
IOR Islands	55,000	2.88 Mn
South & Central Americas	17,000	1.14 Mn
Pacific Islands	9,000	0.25 Mn

Data Source: *Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (moia.gov.in/index.aspx)*

Figure 2: Indian diaspora distribution across the world.[10]

[9] C. Raja Mohan and Rishika Chauhan,"Modi's Foreign Policy—Focus on the Diaspora," *ISAS working paper 204*, April 2015. goo.gl/DDZS3W.

[10]Integrated HQ,Ministry of Defence (Navy), Ensuring Secure Seas :Indian Maritime Security Strategy. goo.gl/9jV2gr

2.4 Current Evacuation Capacity

As described earlier, the present evacuation capacity is inadequate for a large scale evacuation. To understand evacuation operations, it is first important to analyse the present lift capacity of maximum deployable air and sea assets under government control. This is defined as 'stock'. The sea lift capacities (single trip) of all government assets for the purpose of understanding sea lift 'stock' are tabulated below.[11] *Table 1* gives the full sea lift capacity that can be deployed by Indian Navy, Coast Guard and Shipping Corporation of India. Sea evacuation is generally the cheapest option as ships can carry much larger capacity compared to an aircraft. This can be resorted to if speed is not of urgent necessity.

Ser	Organisation	Platform	Carrying capacity (Persons)	Inventory available	Carrying capacity per asset type
1	Indian Navy	Aircraft carrier	4000	1	4000
		Destroyers	600	10	6000
		Frigates	350	14	4900
		Corvettes	150	26	3900
		Landing platforms LST	150	6	900
		Landing platform dock (Jalashwa)	2000	1	2000
		Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)	100	10	1000
		Ships taken up from trade (STUFT)	1000	2	2000
2	Indian Coast Guard	OPV	100	15	1500
		Pollution control vessel (PCV)	400	3	1200
3	Shipping Corporation of India	Liners	3000	6	18000
		Total		**(A)**	**45400**

Table 1. Evacuation capacity by Sea (single trip)

[11] Capacity based on telephonic interview with official involved in evacuations who did not wished to be named

Table 2 below gives in detail the full air lift capacity of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Air India (AI) that can be deployed i.e. the air lift 'stock'. Only the IAF & the AI are under direct government control. The platform in column 2 indicates the type of aircraft followed by its carrying capacity in column 3 and the total inventory available in column 4 according to official data from websites.

Ser	Organisation	Platform	Carrying capacity per aircraft (persons)	Inventory available	Carrying capacity per asset type
1	Indian Air Force	Strategic Heavy Lift C-17 Globemaster	300	10	3000
		Tactical Transport C-130 Hercules	128	6	768
		Transport heavy lift IL 76	140	17	2380
2	Air India	Airbus A-319	144	22	3168
		Airbus A-320	168	3	504
		Airbus A 321-200	184	20	3680
		Boeing 747-400	423	4	1692
		Boeing 777-200 LR	238	3	714
		Boeing 777-300 ER	342	12	4104
		Boeing 787-8	256	8	2048
		Total		**(B)**	**22058**

Table 2. Evacuation capacity by air using government assets(single trip)[12]

From *Tables 1 and 2*, it can be seen that the total current evacuation capacity of government by sea and air (single trip) is **A + B = 67458**. This number is woefully inadequate in case rapid mass evacuation, for example, about 3 million people (from Saudi Arabia) is needed. Therefore, it is necessary to do an analysis of the gap and how it can be overcome.

2.5 Gap Analysis and Figure of Merit

There wide gap between the lift capacity and number of people to be evacuated needs no emphasis. One way to close the gap is procure additional assets that entails investments

[12]Air India fleet details. goo.gl/0ADPc3, US Air Force Globemaster C-17 Factsheet. goo.gl/5oBk4c/, official website of Indian Air Force. goo.gl/oAw1z

running to thousands of crores. Even this will not guarantee narrowing of the gap considerably. But planning can be simplified by incorporating the definition of 'Figure of Merit' for lift capacity. This gives us the unit lift capacity of each asset along with distance covered by that unit.

The 'Figure of Merit' is defined as the number of people that can be transported across a certain distance in kilometres. This is derived by multiplying the carrying capacity of each asset with its maximum operating range in a single trip.

For example, the Figure of Merit (unit: People x Km) for a single C-17 Globemaster aircraft can be taken as shown below.

Figure of merit of C-17 = Carrying capacity x maximum distance travelled per trip in Km

= 300 x 10200[13] = 3060000

This will be used in *Section 3* to analyse how evacuation can be achieved under certain constraints. As it has been shown that military and Public Sector Units (PSUs) like Air India and Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) are inadequate, it is assumed that assets of all commercial airlines and ships will be placed under the control of the government. The calculation of Figures of Merit for each of the sea and air assets is given in *Tables 3 and 4*. *Table 3* below gives the figure of merit for sea lift capacity.

Ser	Platform	Carrying capacity (people)	Distance travelled per day (Km/day)	Figure of Merit	Inventory	Figure of Merit (full capacity)
	Indian Navy					
1	Aircraft carrier	4000	792	3168000	1	3168000
2	Destroyer	600	1056	633600	10	6336000
3	Frigates	350	1344	470400	14	6585600
4	Corvettes	150	1152	172800	26	4492800
5	Landing Ship Tanks	150	672	100800	6	604800
6	Landing Platform Dock (LPD)	2000	672	1344000	1	1344000
7	Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV)	100	960	96000	10	960000
8	Ships taken up from trade (STUFT)-chartered vessels	1000	720	720000	2	1440000

[13]Extracted from fact sheet of C-17 Globemaster at goo.gl/5oBk4c. The distance can be increased by in-flight refuelling.

Ser	Platform	Carrying capacity (people)	Distance travelled per day (Km/day)	Figure of Merit	Inventory	Figure of Merit (full capacity)
	Carrying capacity of Indian Navy (Figure of Merit) per day					24931200
	Indian Coast Guard					
9	OPV	100	960	96000	15	1440000
10	PCV	400	1152	460800	3	1382400
	Carrying capacity of Indian Coast Guard (Figure of Merit) per day					2822400
	Shipping Corporation of India					
11	Liners	750	720	540000	6	3240000
	Total Sea lift capacity (Figure of Merit) per day					30993600

Table 3. Sea lift capacity (Figure of Merit) per day of all assets under government

Table 4 below gives the Figure of Merit for air lift capacity per day of all air assets that can be requisitioned by the government that includes the IAF and commercial players.

Ser	Platform	Carrying Capacity (people)	Distance travelled per day (Km/day)	Figure of Merit	Inventory available	Figure of Merit (per day) full capacity
	Indian Air Force					
1	Strategic Heavy Lift C-17 Globemaster	300	10200	3060180	10	30601800
2	Tactical Transport C-130 Hercules	128	7680	983040	6	5898240
3	Transport heavy lift IL 76	140	7200	1008000	17	17136000
	Air Asia India					
4	Airbus A-320-200	180	10296	1853280	6	11119680
	Air Costa					
5	Embraer E 170	80	10680	854400	2	1708800
6	Embraer E 190	124	10680	1324320	2	2648640
	Air India					
7	Airbus A-319	144	10296	1482624	22	32617728

Ser	Platform	Carrying Capacity (people)	Distance travelled per day (Km/day)	Figure of Merit	Inventory available	Figure of Merit (per day) full capacity
8	Airbus A-320	168	10296	1729728	3	5189184
9	Airbus A 321-200	184	10296	1894464	20	37889280
10	Boeing 747-400	423	11040	4669920	4	18679680
11	Boeing 777-200 LR	238	10860	2584680	3	7754040
12	Boeing 777-300 ER	342	10860	3714120	12	44569440
13	Boeing 787-8	256	10956	2804736	8	22437888
	Air India Regional					
14	ATR 72-600	7	6120	42840	70	2998800
15	ATR 42-320	48	5520	264960	4	1059840
16	Bombardier	70	8004	560280	3	1680840
	Go Air					
17	Airbus A-320-200	180	10296	1853280	19	35212320
18	Airbus Neo	186	9936	1848096	1	1848096
	Jet Airways					
19	Airbus A 330-8	254	10452	2654808	8	21238464
20	Airbus A-330-300	293	10452	3062436	4	12249744
21	ATR 72-500	68	6120	416160	15	6242400
22	ATR 72-600	68	6120	416160	3	1248480
23	Boeing 737-700	134	9960	1334640	5	6673200
24	Boeing 737-800	168	9960	1673280	65	108763200
25	Boeing 737-900	166	9960	1653360	2	3306720
26	Boeing 737-900 ER	184	9960	1832640	4	7330560

Ser	Platform	Carrying Capacity (people)	Distance travelled per day (Km/day)	Figure of Merit	Inventory available	Figure of Merit (per day) full capacity
27	Boeing 737-300 ER	346	9960	3446160	10	34461600
	Spice Jet					
28	Boeing 737-800	186	9960	1852560	21	38903760
29	Boeing 737-900 ER	212	9960	2111520	4	8446080
30	Bombardier Dash 8Q-400	78	8004	624312	16	9988992
	Vistara					
31	Airbus A-320-200	158	10296	1626768	10	16267680
		Total airlift capacity (Figure of Merit) per day (100%)				**556171176**

Table 4. Air lift capacity (Figure of Merit) of all air assets under the government[14]

The next section will analyse how the figure of merit can be used for possible scenarios of evacuations.

3. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR EVACUATION

3.1 Scenario 1—Saudi Arabia/Qatar

In order to evolve a strategy for the same, a risk framework needs to be developed with each risk type identified by a number R1, R2, R3…R10 and assigned a probability of impact that could be termed high (H), medium(M) and low(L). The broad categorisation of high, medium and low is based on historical evaluation. This framework could assist a policy maker in making decisions about whether to use state assets to evacuate or not. Similar risk templates can be drawn for other regions of the world. *Table 5* below shows the risk framework template for West Asia.

[14] Air India fleet details. goo.gl/0ADPc3, Jet Airways fleet information. goo.gl/GNQl5H, SpiceJet fleet information. goo.gl/pmcCw0, Go Air fleet details and history. goo.gl/BX4ieS, Vistara fleet details and history. goo.gl/hVfrN7

Ser	Risk Type (R)	Probability of Impact		
		High (H)	Medium (M)	Low (L)
1	Ill Treatment of Workers/Employees by companies/ Denial of rights (R1)		M	
2	Loss of Property due to expropriation (R2)	H		
3	Hijack/Kidnap (R3)			L
4	Military conflict/strife (R4)	H		
5	Racial/ethnic/ political violence (R5)	H		
6	Communal riots (R6)			L
7	Economic crisis, for example currency shock or falling crude prices(R7)	H		
8	Xenophobia (R8)	H		
9	Issue of religious identity (R9)	H		
10	Natural disaster (R10)			L

Table 5. Risk template for West Asia

Situation: In a probable conflict scenario between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Indians may need to be evacuated from Saudi Arabia which has a high Non Resident Indian(NRI) population of about 3 million. If the Riyadh airport is closed, the first part of the evacuation will need to be accomplished by road to Doha before being evacuated by air from Doha. The assumptions are as below:

- The Indian embassy has signed agreements for road transport with transport companies. The number of days that it will take to evacuate people by road will depend directly on the rate at which they can be positioned in Riyadh from other cities of Saudi Arabia where expatriate Indians are present.
- All assets can be positioned in the quickest possible time for operation.
- Delays for exit visas for such a large number of people can not be estimated. That will depend purely on the situation and the diplomatic relations with the host country.

The summary of present air lift capacity from *Table 4* is as below. The first column gives the percentage availability of assets in descending order from 100% to 30%. The second column gives the figure of merit per day which corresponds to the percentage availability of assets.

Lift Capacity based on percentage availability of assets	Figure of Merit per day
100%	556169376
80%	444935500.8
60%	333701625.6
50%	278084688
40%	222467750.4
30%	166850812.8

Table 6. Air lift capacity at varying rates of utilisation of assets

From *Table 6*, calculation can be done for the time taken for air lift from West Asia. Two cases of evacuation scenarios are considered.

Case 1—Evacuation from Riyadh (distance from Riyadh to Mumbai - 2780 Km)

Indian population in Saudi Arabia to be evacuated - 3 million i.e. 3,000,000

Desired evacuation capacity = 3,000,000 x 2780 = 8,34,000,0000.

The desired evacuation capacity now should be divided by the figure of merit per day from *Table 5* at different percentages of availability of assets. That gives us the number of days at various percentages of assets' availability. The calculation has been done for 100%, 50% and 30% availability of assets. The evacuation can be achieved between **15 to 50** days as shown in the table below. The first row gives the desired evacuation capacity. The first column shows the percentage availability of assets. The second column gives the figure of merit per day corresponding to the percentage availability of assets. The number of days required for evacuation in the third column is derived by dividing the desired evacuation capacity by the figures in second column as shown in *Table 7* below.

Desired Evacuation Capacity		8340000000
Percentage availability of assets	**Figure of Merit per day**	**No of days required to evacuate**
100%	556169376	15.0
50%	278084688	30.0
30%	166850812.8	50.0

Table 7. Summary of evacuation from Riyadh

Case 2-Evacuation from Doha (distance from Doha to Mumbai-2300 Km)

Desired evacuation capacity = 3,000,000 x 2300=6900000000

As calculated in *Table 7*, the desired evacuation capacity should be divided by the figure of merit per day at different percentages of availability of assets. The evacuation can be achieved between **13 to 42** days as shown in *Table 8* below.

Desired Evacuation Capacity		**6900000000**
Percentage availability of assets	**Figure of Merit per day**	**No of days required to evacuate**
100%	556169376	12.4
50%	278084688	24.8
30%	166850812.8	41.4

Table 8. Summary of evacuation from Doha

As 100% availability of assets would be nearly impossible, even if 50% of all government and commercial assets are available, evacuation can be done in 30 days from Riyadh and 25 days from Doha.

3.2 Scenario for cross continent evacuation - Fiji (Diaspora population - 315200)

The Indian diaspora in Fiji has had an uneasy relationship with the indigenous population. They are the descendants of indentured labour taken by the British for sugar plantations in Fiji towards the end of the 19th century. Due to their enterprising nature, they quickly occupied important positions in the government and industry and flourished. Two coups in 1987 changed the political landscape of Fiji.

Forming 52 percent of the population in the 1980s, the number of ethnic Indians has come down to 44 per cent because of steady migration to western countries by 2010.[15] The steadily dwindling numbers of ethnic Indians demonstrates the strong undercurrents of ethno-nationalism. In 2000, an ethnic Indian Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry was overthrown in a bloodless coup.

Fiji is strategically important for India as it hosts a satellite station of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). There is always a lurking possibility of disenfranchisement of the ethnic

[15] Balaji Chandramohan,"Political Crisis in Fiji and India's concerns," *IDSA Comment*, August 19, 2010 at goo.gl/ubDyks

Indians, which may result in their exodus. Also, as a majority of ethnic Indians are in the higher income strata, they may like to migrate to Australia, New Zealand or the USA. Notwithstanding that, the Indian government must be ready for an evacuation of the Indian diaspora at short notice of any contingency like a coup or an ethnic riot (a remote possibility though), which is likely to endanger the lives of ethnic Indians. There can be three possibilities of evacuation.

Case 1-Evacuation from Fiji to Mumbai

The distance of Fiji from Mumbai is 12260 Km with a flying time of 21h 30m (two stops). Any evacuation would have to be necessarily done by air. With the available assets and requisitioning of other commercial airlines, the operation prima facie is not very difficult.

Indian population in Fiji to be evacuated - 315200

Desired evacuation capacity-315200 x 12260 Km= 3864352000

The desired evacuation capacity should be divided by the figure of merit as done in *Tables 7* and *8*. The evacuation to Mumbai can be done between **7 to 23** days as shown in *Table 9* below.

Desired Evacuation Capacity		**3864352000**
Percentage availability of assets	**Figure of Merit per day**	**No of days required for evacuation**
100%	556169376	6.9
50%	278084688	13.9
30%	166850812.8	23.2

Table 9. Evacuation from Fiji to Mumbai

There has been a steady migration of Indo-Fijians to western countries due to increasing racial tensions. It can be assumed that in a future crisis situation, the community might want to be escape to either Australia or New Zealand.

Geographically, these are the closest destinations for safety. Due to liberal democratic governments, it will also be much easier for the community to stake a claim for political asylum in these countries.

Case 2 - Evacuation from Fiji to Australia

If some (or most) of the diaspora so desire, alternative destinations for evacuation could be to Canberra, Australia.

Distance from Suva to Canberra-3460 Km

Desired evacuation capacity is 315200 x 3460 = 1090592000. This evacuation capacity should be divided by the figure of merit depending upon percentage availability of assets to arrive at the number of days. The evacuation can be achieved between **2 to 7 days** as in *Table 10* below.

Desired Evacuation Capacity		**1090592000**
Percentage availability of assets	**Figure of Merit per day**	**No of days required to evacuate**
100%	556169376	2.0
50%	278084688	3.9
30%	166850812.8	6.5

Table 10. Evacuation from Fiji to Australia

Case 3- Evacuation from Fiji to New Zealand

Distance from Suva to Wellington-2600 Km

Desired evacuation capacity = 315200 x 2600 = 819520000. This evacuation capacity should be divided by the figure of merit depending upon percentage availability of assets in descending order from 100% to 30% similar to the calculation done in table 10. The evacuation can be achieved between **1.5 to 5 days** as in *Table 11* below.

Desired Evacuation Capacity		**819520000**
Percentage availability of assets	**Figure of Merit per day**	**No of days required to evacuated**
100%	556169376	1.5
50%	278084688	2.9
30%	166850812.8	4.9

Table 11. Evacuation from Fiji to New Zealand

The summary of various evacuation scenarios from *Tables 9,10, and 11* is as below.

Percentage availability of assets	Evacuation from Fiji to Mumbai (days)	Evacuation from Fiji to Australia (days)	Evacuation from Fiji to New Zealand (days)
100%	7	2	1.5
50%	14	4	3
30%	23	7	5

Table 12. Summary of evacuation from Fiji to India, Australia and New Zealand.

4. CONCLUSION

The risks to diaspora in the host countries have always been present. As India's power and clout grew in 1990s, it has got involved actively in diaspora affairs. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that within the last decade itself, India has evacuated Indians (and even foreigners) on five occasions, all from West Asia. The recommendations of this brief are summarised as below:

- *Secure rights to use aircrafts and ships not directly belonging to the government.* The earlier evacuations have primarily been driven by government assets such as the Indian Navy, Indian Air Force and Air India. Of course, Jet Airways was utilised in the evacuation from Yemen. But there is a need for a policy in which the government can call for aircraft and ships which are under private airline operators. There is no greater urgent matter for a private airline operator than attending to a crisis of national interest. Thus, there is a need for a licensing clause with commercial airlines that says that they will make their aircraft and crew available during times of crises like these.

- *Sign standing agreements between Indian Embassies/Missions abroad and private operators*. Before evacuation by ship or aircraft, the dispersed population must be transported by road to the airport or port. As infrastructure and assets in the conflict zone will be under attack, it will be a near-impossible task to requisition buses and trucks to carry people to the nearest airport or port when crisis strikes. A standing agreement with international logistics companies and transport operators with insurance liabilities will facilitate immediate movement of the people. This will allow Indian embassy staff to focus on other pressing issues such as visa arrangements, when crossing entails more than one border. In extreme circumstances, the embassy may even have to take steps to get visa requirements waived.

- *Sign agreements with friendly countries for sea and air bases for evacuations*. Assuming that the host country bases are not usable for various reasons in times of conflict, the government should have arrangements with friendly countries in every region where there is a high concentration of diaspora. As evacuation by air would be the quickest, having access to safe airfields close to conflict zones will be highly desirable. Also, access to ports are also necessary which gives an air of benignity to the operations.

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Cover Images: Operation 'Sankat Mochan' from Sudan, 15 July 2016 from facebook page of Ministry of External affairs, Government of India. goo.gl/9mpxSF

Operation 'Rahat', Evacuation by Indian Navy from Yemen, April 2015 from the website of Indian Navy. goo.gl/Vc0z1j

APPENDIX 1

Detailed classification of Indians and Indian diaspora (not to scale).



1-**Indian citizen (2+3+4+5)**

2-Indian by birth/descent (born in India, born to Indian parents), residing in India

3-Non-resident Indian (a subset of this is by birth or descent & others through conversion)

4-Indian citizen who converted from a foreigner to Indian citizenship through application to GoI (**4a+4b+4c)**

4a-Foreigner to Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) and then to becoming Indian citizen by registration

4b-Foreigner to Indian citizen through naturalisation

4c-Foreigner to regular Indian citizen through registration (non OCI)

5-Indian citizen from foreign citizenship Indian through naturalisation or registration (becomes Indian citizen but continues to stay abroad)

6-**Non Indian citizen who is NOT an OCI cardholder (6a+6b)**

6a-Non Indian citizens who have traces of Indian roots in their previous generations but not eligible for OCI card (means an ethnic Indian abroad who neither is an Indian citizen nor an OCI card holder)

6a'- *Stateless people of Indian Origin or descendants of PIO (who are not citizens of their host country or any other country or India) but seeking their right to become Indian citizens. For example, Stateless Indian origin people in*

Burma, Malaysia, Kuwait, Jamaica etc. who migrated as indentured labour before 26th Jan,1950.

6b- Non Indian citizens who have traces of Indian roots in their previous generations or have relationships with Indian citizens/OCI or non OCI card holder and eligible for OCI card

7-Non Indian citizen who is an OCI cardholder (7a+7b)

7a-Non Indian OCI card holder through application to GoI (7a1+7a2+7a3+7a4)

7a1-*Spouse OCI or Indian citizen*

7a2-(i)Belonged to territory that became part of India after 15th August 1947(ii) citizen of India at the time of, or at any time after 26th Jan 1950, (iii) is eligible to become a citizen of India on 26 Jan 1950.

7a3 - Child or grandchild or great grandchild of citizen who meets criteria of 9b

7a4-Minor child of persons meeting criteria of 9a, 9b, 9c and also where both parents/ one of the parent is a citizen of India

7b -Non Indian PIO who becomes OCI card holder (from Jan 2015, PIO converted to OCI as per GoI. There is no PIO card valid now)

10-Indians and Indian Diaspora (1+6+7)